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I. INTRODUCTION
No trial in the recent history of American jurisprudence has
captivated the public attention as much as the prosecution of O.J.
Simpson. This trial, more than any other, has solidified the public's
perception of the inequities of the justice system: wealthy defendants
employing private counsel are acquitted, while indigent defendants
assisted by public defenders are convicted.
Under the doctrine of equal protection, indigent defendants must
have the same opportunity to obtain a meaningful defense as wealthy
defendants.' In this country, however, the sad truth is that the
quality of one's defense is directly proportional to the size of one's
bank account. "[O.J.] just happens to be much richer than the
average murder defendant-hence the never-ending parade of big-
name lawyers, sub-lawyers with DNA specialties, jury consultants,
investigators and experts."2 According to one of his attorneys, Mr.
Simpson will have spent five to six million dollars by the end of the
trial.3 Conversely, Robert Spangenberg, coauthor of a 1993 Ameri-
can Bar Association report on indigent defense, believes that if Mr.
Simpson had been represented by a public defender, "it would [have
been] a two-day trial, an open-and-shut case."4
Mr. Spangenberg's statement mirrors the prevailing societal
attitude about the quality of legal assistance rendered to indigent
defendants. It is reflected in such comments as "I don't want a public
defender, I want a real lawyer," or "Did you have an attorney on
your last case? No, I had a public defender."5 Indigent defendants
often refer to their court-appointed attorneys as "dump-trucks,"
because they believe that public defenders are more interested in
trying to "dump" them as soon as possible than in providing a
vigorous defense.6 The primary dissatisfaction of indigent defendants
with their public defenders stems from the clients' perceptions that
1. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
2. Elizabeth Gleick, Rich Justice, Poor Justice: Did we need O.J. to remind us that
money makes all the difference-in the trial and in the verdict?, TIME, June 19, 1995, at 40,
40.
3. l
4. Id at 40-41.
5. Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and
Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 473, 474.
6. Id.
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the public defenders do not spend enough time on their cases, do not
care about their interests, and pressure them to plead guilty.'
Unfortunately, this perception rings true in light of the enactment
of the "three-strikes" laws throughout the nation8 which resulted in
an explosion in trials of indigent defendants, and the concomitant
need for publicly funded attorneys to defend them.9 The reality is
that there are too many indigent defendants and not enough public
funds or attorneys." This lack of funding for public defenders is
directly responsible for the perceived dumping problem: the less
money supplied to the office, the less investigative and medical expert
support, the fewer public defenders employed, and hence the fewer
public defenders available for indigent defense. Consequently,
indigent defendants receive inadequate assistance of counsel.
Obviously, one of the advantages of being wealthy is the ability
to purchase the best that money can buy, including the best criminal
defense. This Comment does not claim that all indigent defendants
are entitled to the same type of defense as O.J. Simpson. Rather, it
asserts that there is a minimum level of adequate representation
mandated by the U.S. Constitution to which all defendants, whether
indigent or wealthy, are entitled. The question is whether this
minimum level of adequate representation can be satisfied with
inadequately funded public defender programs. This Comment
addresses this inquiry by specifically focusing on the recent financial
disaster in California's Orange County, that necessitated emergency
measures resulting in budget cuts to the county's public defender's
office and its complete reorganization. This Comment addresses the
effects of such emergency measures on the quality of assistance
provided to indigent defendants in Orange County in particular, and
uses the Orange County bankruptcy as an example to discuss the
effects of underfunding of public defender programs in general.
7. Id.
8. As of February 1995, 14 states have enacted "three-strikes" laws. Michael G.
Turner et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation: A National Assessment, FED.
PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 16, 18. They are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
9. See infra part III.B.
10. See Rebecca Marcus, Racism in Our Courts: The Underfunding of Public
Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 219 (1994).
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Until December 1994 Orange County had a population of nearly
2.6 million and a median household income of $47,774." It was the
fifth largest county in the United States and the fourth richest county
government' 2 -until the financial debacle which resulted in the loss
of $1.5 billion in public funds in an investment pool managed by
County Treasurer Robert Citron. 3 In 1979 Citron initiated a change
in state law to allow counties and municipalities to borrow money
from private firms to engage in reverse purchase agreements.
14
During the 1980s, this arrangement provided Orange County with a
return of over nine percent per year, nearly double that of other
California investment pools.'5 However, with the increase in interest
rates, the investment began to falter until December 1994 when
Orange County declared bankruptcy to prevent creditors from calling
in its loans. 6 This was the largest municipal collapse in U.S.
history.7 As a result, the County instituted emergency budget cuts
to help deflect the financial consequences of the bankruptcy. The
hardest hit by the budget reductions were those public services
provided to indigents, including the public defender program. 8
This Comment analyzes the emergency budgetary measures and
reorganization of the public defender's office, and concludes that such
measures adversely impact the rights of the County's indigent
defendants to receive effective assistance of counsel. Part II outlines
the historical development of the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel, including the right to court-appointed assistance
of counsel. The development of the public defender programs in
general and the current state of public defender programs-their
inadequacy in light of tougher sentencing laws' 9 -is addressed in
Part III. Part IV reviews Orange County's public defender program
11. John Greenwald, The California Wipeout: Orange Countyfilesfor bankruptcy after
losing big on high-risk investments, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 55, 56.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 55.
14. Id. at 56. This type of arrangement allows counties to borrow short-term loans
from private firms and invest them in longer-term bonds that pay more interest thereby
resulting in a profit to the counties or municipalities. Id. The value of the bonds
purchased moves in the opposite direction of interest rates, thus if interest rates fall, the
value of the bonds increases. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id at 55.
18. See discussion infra part IV.B.
19. See infra part III.B.
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specifically, pre- and post-bankruptcy, and in particular the devastat-
ing budgetary cuts suffered by the program. Part V applies the recent
California Supreme Court decision on the standard for, effective
assistance of counsel to the Orange County Office of the Public
Defender. Part VI discusses and compares the existing laws in other
jurisdictions regarding the constitutionality of their public defender
programs, and addresses the viability of Orange County's new public
defender program. Finally, this Comment identifies similar budget
problems faced by other state public defender programs and proposes
a possible solution to some of the problems outlined in this Comment.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. The Development of the Right
1. From the right to counsel to the right
to court-appointed counsel
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial,... and to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense.20
To determine whether indigent defendants are receiving the
constitutionally mandated assistance of counsel, the development of
the right, and its intended function, must first be analyzed. The right
of indigent defendants to the assistance of court-appointed counsel
began with Powell v. Alabama2 in which the United States Supreme
Court declared that the "right to the aid of counsel is of... funda-
mental character."'  The Johnson v. Zerbst' Court followed by
requiring appointment of counsel to all indigent federal defen-
dants-unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.24
The Johnson Court concluded that the assistance of counsel "is one
of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to
insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.... The Sixth
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, § 1.
21. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22. Id. at 68; see also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936)
(stating that "certain fundamental rights ... [are] safeguarded against state action ...
among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal
prosecution").
23. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
24. Id. at 467-69.
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Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional
safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done."'"The issue of whether this Sixth Amendment right to counsel26
is binding on the states was determined in the landmark case of
Gideon v. Wainwright.' Gideon was charged with breaking and
entering a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.28 In
Florida, where petitioner was charged, this offense was a felony.29
When petitioner appeared in court, he had no funds and no attorney
to assist him." When Gideon requested to have an attorney
appointed to represent him, the trial court replied that "[u]nder the
laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint
Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with
a capital offense."'"
Prior to Gideon, the Supreme Court followed its rule in Betts v.
Brady32 that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant
charged with a felony in a state proceeding did not necessarily violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 The Court
in Betts engaged in a "totality of circumstances" review to determine
the constitutionality of the denial of the right to appointed counsel.M
The Betts Court held that an "[a]sserted denial [of due process] is to
be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That
which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances
... fall short of such denial."'35
It recognized that although the Sixth Amendment mandated "no
rule for the conduct of the States, 3 6 if the amendment imposes upon
25. Id. at 462 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), which stated
that if the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination were lost, justice could still be
done).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause reads: "No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .. " Id.
27. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28. Id. at 336.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 337.
31. Id.
32. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
33. Id. at 471-72.
34. Id. at 462.
35. Id.
36. d. at 465.
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the nation "a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so,
to due process of law,.., it is made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment."37  The Court, however, went on to
conclude that, under the circumstances of the case, the right to
appointment of counsel was not a fundamental right which is essential
to a fair trial."
Because the facts in Betts were almost identical to those in
Gideon, the Gideon Court directed the parties to specifically address
whether "[the] Court's holding in [Betts should] be reconsidered."39
The Gideon Court accepted Betts's assumption that "a provision of
the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial'
is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'  The Gideon Court concluded that based upon precedent
which held the right to the assistance or aid of counsel to be
fundamental, the right of indigent defendants to appointed counsel is
also a fundamental right.
2. The extension of the right to state proceedings
The Court in Gideon relied on public policy rationales to
overturn Betts and held that the right of indigent defendants to
receive assistance of appointed counsel extends to state proceedings.
The most paramount consideration was the belief that "in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him."41 The nation's Constitution and laws
strongly emphasize procedural and substantive safeguards which are
37. Id.
38. Id. at 471.
39. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338 (citation omitted).
40. Id. at 342 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465). This assumption had already been
embraced by this Court to incorporate various enumerated rights within the Bill of Rights
against the states. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(freedom of speech and press). In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court
refused to extend the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy to the states.
However, the Court still recognized and emphasized that "immunities that are valid as
against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments
have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states." Id. at 324-25 (footnote
omitted).
41. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
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designed to ensure fair trials where every defendant stands equal
before the law.42
This ideal cannot be realized by an accused who does not receive
the assistance of counsel in facing the accusers. The right to the
assistance of counsel is essential in protecting all other rights of the
defendant under the Constitution.43 If a defendant does not receive
the assistance of counsel, the defendant, as a layperson, will be ill-
equipped to fully comprehend the constitutional rights, and as a
result, the "right to be heard" will merely be a farce.' As Justice
Sutherland stated in Powell:
Even the intelligent and educated lay [person] has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with [a]
crime, [the defendant] is incapable, generally, of determining
.. whether the indictment is good or bad. [The defendant]
is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence... [and] lacks both
the skill and knowledge [to] adequately.., prepare his [or
her] defense, even though he [or she may] have a perfect
one. [The defendant] requires the guiding hand of counsel.
... Without it, though [the defendant] be not guilty, he [or
she] faces the danger of conviction because [the defendant]
does not know how to establish his [or her] innocence.45
3. The scope of the right to court-appointed
counsel in state proceedings
Though Gideon was successful in extending the protection of
court-appointed counsel to state proceedings, the scope of the
protection covered only felony cases.46 In Argersinger v. Hamlin,"
the indigent petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon,
an offense punishable by imprisonment of up to six months, a $1000
fine, or both.' The petitioner was denied court-appointed counsel
which he claimed denied him the opportunity to raise "good and
sufficient defenses" to the charge against him.49 The Court in
42. Id.
43. See cases cited infra note 99.
44. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
45. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
46. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
47. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
48. Ld. at 26.
49. Md
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Argersinger rejected the holding in Duncan v. Louisianaoi that the
right to a jury trial is equivalent to the right to assistance of coun-
sel."1 The Argersinger Court stated that the assistance of counsel is
often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial,52 whereas a
fundamentally fair trial can exist without a jury. 3 The Court went
on to conclude that the rationales of Powell and Gideon extend to any
criminal trial 'where those accused are deprived of their liberty.4
The Court determined that the right to court-appointed assistance of
counsel is applicable in misdemeanor and petty offenses as well as
felonies.5 However, since the petitioner in Argersinger faced actual
imprisonment, the Court declined to decide whether the prospect of
imprisonment is required before the right to court-appointed counsel
attaches.
56
Scott v. Illinois7 determined this issue. In Scott, the indigent
petitioner was convicted of shoplifting and fined $50.58 The maxi-
mum sentence for such an offense carried either a $500 fine, one year
imprisonment, or both. 9 The Scott Court declared that "the central
premise of Argersinger-that actual imprisonment is a penalty
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment-is
eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the
line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel."'
Thus, the states can choose between appointing counsel for the
indigent defendant and retaining the right to imprison the accused, or
not appointing counsel and impose only a fine upon conviction.
The Supreme Court subsequently determined that the Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel attaches at the "critical
stage" and not necessarily only at trial.6
50. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
51. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 29-31.
S2. Id. at 31.
53. Id. at 30-31.
54. Id. at 32.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id.
57. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
58. Id. at 368.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 373.
61. See cases cited infra note 99.
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B. The Quality of Counsel Mandated by the Constitution
Because of the integral role counsel plays in the adversarial
system by protecting the defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial,
courts recognized that the assistance of counsel entails more than
mere presence of counsel in the courtroom. 2 The Sixth Amendment
emphasizes the right to counsel because it envisions counsel playing
a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce
just results.63 Therefore, the courts determined that the "right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."'
Effective assistance of counsel, in turn, requires that counsel be
a "reasonably competent attorney."65 In Strickland v. Washington,6
the Court set forth the standard for determining the ineffectiveness of
counsel. The defendant must show that counsel made "errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,"'67 which entails a showing
that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness."' In addition, "the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense," so that the result is
unreliable.69 The court must decide the actual effectiveness of the
counsel's assistance on the facts of the particular case viewed as of the
time of counsel's conduct.7 ° Though the standard of review is very
deferential to the strategic decisions of counsel, the primary goal of
the review is to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial."
In assessing the effectiveness of counsel, the court must look to
the most important of counsel functions, the "overarching duty to
advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to
consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the
prosecution."' 2
62. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
63. Id.
64. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 771.
66. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
67. Id at 687.
68. Id. at 687-88.
69. Id. at 687.
70. Id. at 690.
71. Id. at 689.
72. Id at 688.
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This constitutionally mandated commitment to reasonably
effective assistance of counsel is the key issue being addressed in this
Comment. Are indigent defendants in Orange County being accorded
this constitutional guarantee? This Comment argues that they are
not. With the recent budget cuts, the Orange County Office of the
Public Defender is unable to meet the constitutional mandate set
forth in Strickland.
C. California's Standard for Effective Counsel
The California Supreme Court has thus far only engaged in case-
by-case analysis of whether defendants are receiving reasonably
effective assistance of counsel. As recently as February 5, 1996, the
court reaffirmed the standard by which review of reasonably effective
assistance of counsel would be undertaken.7 3
In California, the Strickland standard governs review of effective
counsel.74 The In re Avena court ruled that to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate the
deficiency of the attorney's performance by showing that it fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness. The defendant must
additionally show prejudice to the defendant flowing from the
counsel's performance The court stated that such prejudice to the
defendant is established when there is a sufficient probability that the
confidence in the outcome is undermined by counsel's conduct.76
The court, however, recognized that "in some cases ineffective
assistance must be presumed 'without inquiry into the actual conduct
of the trial' because the 'likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully
competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small' that the
cost of litigating the issue is unjustified."77 The In re Avena court
further stated
[t]here are ... circumstances that are so likely to prejudice
the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a
particular case is unjustified .... [If counsel entirely fails to
73. In re Avena, 12 Cal. 4th 694, 909 P.2d 1017, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 413 (1996).
74. Id. at 721, 909 P.2d at 1032, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428 (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
75. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92).
76. Id., 909 P.2d at 1032-33, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428-29 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694).
77. Id. at 726-27, 909 P.2d at 1036, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432 (quoting People v. Bonin,
47 Cal. 3d 808, 844, 765 P.2d 460, 480, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 319 (1989) (quoting United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1983))).
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subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment
rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively
unreliable.'
However, Justice Lucas, writing for the majority, and Justice
Mosk, dissenting, differed sharply as to when the presumption would
apply. The majority narrowly interpreted the scope of United States
v. Cronic,7 9 the companion case to Strickland, and stated that unless
counsel was entirely absent or actually prevented from participating
in a critical stage of the proceeding, the defendant must show
prejudice flowing from the counsel's performance. 80 Justice Mosk,
in contrast, believed that Cronic sought to expand the statement in
Strickland that "'[i]n certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is
presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel
altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various
kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance......
Under Justice Mosk's analysis, the fundamental requirement in
Strickland is for counsel to act in the role of an advocate, so that the
accused can subject the prosecution's case to a meaningful adversarial
testing.' However, when there is no "'confrontation between
adversaries,"' there is a violation of the constitutional guarantee.83
The lack of confrontation between adversaries can result either from
(1) the absence of counsel altogether, or (2) counsel's failure to
subject the prosecution's case to a meaningful adversarial testing. 4
But unlike the majority, Justice Mosk did not feel that Cronic limited
the second prong to cases like Davis v. Alaska,' in which the
defense counsel was actually prohibited from cross-examining the
78. Id. at 727,909 P.2d at 1036,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-
59) (alteration in original).
79. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
80. Avena, 12 Cal. 4th at 727, 909 P.2d at 1036-37, 49 Cal. Rtpr. 2d at 432-33 (citing
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 nn.25-26); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (holding
that assistance of counsel is ineffective when defense counsel is prevented from cross-
examining crucial prosecution witness).
81. Avena, 12 Cal. 4th at 774, 909 P.2d at 1067, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692).
82. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57).
83. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657).
84. Id., 909 P.2d at 1067-68, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463-64 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
85. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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prosecution's witness.86 Instead, Justice Mosk asserted that Davis
was but one example of the types of interference which may
constructively deny defendant the assistance of counsel.' The
Cronic analysis, according to Justice Mosk, is not limited to cases of
denial of cross-examination but refers to all cases of failure of
adversarial testing that are of the same "magnitude."'  Most
significantly, the failure to engage in timely and in-depth investigation
of the strengths, weaknesses, and potential defenses of the prosecu-
tion's case, along with thorough pretrial testing of the prosecution's
evidence, is a failure of adversarial testing of the same magnitude as
a denial of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness.8 9 Therefore,
a defendant need not prove actual prejudice affecting the outcome of
the case to prevail on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
As will be discussed below, 9 this Comment argues that the standard
from Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion is the correct standard of
review for effective counsel. Further, it argues that under this
standard, the assistance rendered by the Orange County Office of the
Public Defender is unconstitutional.
III. THE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAM
A. The Evolution of the Program
Since the constitutional requirement of court-appointed counsel
developed recently,9' public defender programs did not develop in
large numbers until the late 1960s.' Initially, the number of
attorneys required to handle indigent cases Was very small due to the
Betts holding, which failed to extend the right to appointed counsel
for indigents to state prosecutions.93 Because most criminal prosecu-
tions are at the state level,94 and the "totality of circumstances"
86. Avena, 12 Cal. 4th at 776, 909 P.2d at 1069, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. at 777, 909 P.2d at 1069, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 774-75, 909 P.2d at 1068, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
90. See infra part V.A.
91. See supra part II.A-B.
92. Mounts, supra note 5, at 476.
93. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
94. Mounts, supra note 5, at 477.
June 1996] 1907
1908 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1895
standard used by the Betts Court9' necessitated appointed counsel in
very few cases, it was easier to appoint counsel on a case-by-case basis
through the local bar.96
This practice changed after Gideon v. Wainwright' which held
that the right to the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants
is a fundamental right which must be applied against the states.98
The expansion of the scope of this right in subsequent cases further
necessitated the development of a comprehensive public defender
program capable of meeting the demands of the increased indigent
caseload.Y This expansion created a need for defender services on
an unprecedented scale"° which could not be met with appointment
through the local bar-which were generally uncompensated
services.10' Supporters of the public defender programs believed
that if they could institute defender programs that allowed attorneys
to specialize in criminal law and receive a reasonable salary for their
services, they could ensure competent representation."w Because of
the sheer volume of indigent cases and the perceived cost effective-
ness of public defender programs, a large number of jurisdictions
established defender offices after the decision in Argersinger °3
B. The Effect of Three-Strikes Laws on Public Defender Caseloads
The public defender's offices replaced, for the most part, the
appointment of counsel through the private bar for indigent defense.
However, the challenge to the public defender's offices to provide
effective assistance of counsel has intensified, due not only to the
expansion of the right to court-appointed assistance of counsel, but
95. Betts, 316 U.S. at 462.
96. Mounts, supra note 5, at 478.
97. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
98. Id. at 344; see supra part II.A.1..
99. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that the right attaches to any case
in which conviction would result in actual incarceration); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972) (holding that the right attaches to misdemeanors as well as felonies); Coleman
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (holding that the right attaches at preliminary hearing);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that the right attaches during pretrial
lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the right attaches during
custodial interrogation). Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that a Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel exists at the first level of appeal. Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963).
100. Mounts, supra note 5, at 481.
101. Id. at 478.
102. Id. at 478-79.
103. Id. at 481 & n.40.
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because of the newly enacted three-strikes laws." In California,
the three-strikes law has taken its toll on an already beleaguered
public defender's office."t 5
In March 1994, California Governor Pete Wilson signed the
Jones-Costa Bill into law."°6 Under this new three-strikes scheme,
first-time felony offenders are sentenced according to the prior
existing sentencing guidelines."t For second-time offenders, the
new law doubles the minimum required sentence." 8 The crux of the
new law, however, is the three-strikes provision, which mandates that
state courts sentence to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment
those individuals previously convicted of two or more serious or
violent felonies."°
The intent of the three-strikes legislation is to target habitual
felons-or career criminals-and remove them from the nation's
communities.11 Its proponents argue that removal of criminals
allows society to function without the worry of further victimization
from individuals who should have been locked away in prison. 1' In
California, the three-strikes legislation has imposed staggering burdens
on the criminal justice system. n 2 Since the enactment of the three-
strikes law, California has experienced a 150% increase in felony
trials."' With the increase in felony trials, the courts are experienc-
ing a substantial backlog of cases which could prevent the detainment
of offenders awaiting trial, forcing jurisdictions to release violent
pretrial felons."'
104. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
106. Daniel M. Weintraub, "3 Strikes" Law Goes into Effect, L.A. TIMES (Orange
County ed.), Mar. 8, 1994, at Al, A23.
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
108. Note, Recent Legislation: Criminal Procedure-Sentenci'ng-California Enacts
Enhancements for Prior Felony Convictions, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2123 (1994).
109. Id. at 2124 (citing to CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1996)). The
statutes do not call for life imprisonment without possibility of parole when a defendant
is convicted of a third felony. It actually means that a convicted three-time felon will now
have to serve triple the first-time sentence, with a minimum of 25 years. Id. at 2124 n.10;
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A).
110. Turner et al., supra note 8, at 32.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 34.
113. Id.
114. Id. This is especially true in light of the fact that as more habitual offenders are
sentenced to life under the three-strikes legislation, prisons will be unable to house all
those convicted and will have to utilize county jails to house convicts until space becomes
available. Id.
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The Supervisor of the Orange County District Attorney's Office,
Brent Romney, believes that the "three-strikes, you're out" legislation
has made defendants less likely to plea bargain, sending twice as
many felony cases to trial than one year ago."5 A defendant
charged with a felony under this scheme has no incentive to plea
bargain and instead chooses to go to trial. Judges in California have
considered reducing the number of civil trials to free up courtrooms
and to make room for criminal trials.'16 However, the increase in
the number of cases resulting from the three-strikes legislation will
require counties to expand the physical size of their courts, and hire
more judges and prosecutors to process the cases.'17 Consequently,
counties must hire more public defenders to provide adequate defense
for indigent defendants. However, the bankrupt Orange County is
unable to hire the needed public defenders for indigent representa-
tion. As a result, indigent defendants prosecuted under the three-
strikes provision may face life imprisonment without the constitution-
ally mandated level of assistance.
IV. ORANGE COUNTY'S PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAM
A. The Requirement of Indigence
The level of indigence that qualifies for public defender assistance
varies according to each state. In California, a defendant who is
unable to afford counsel may have one provided by the county in
which the accused is charged. 18 California Penal Code section 987
provides that in a noncapital or capital case "[i]f [the defendant]
desires and is unable to employ counsel the court shall assign counsel
to defend [the defendant]."' 9 Likewise, California Government
Code section 27706 states that it is the duty of a public defender,
[u]pon the order of the court or upon the request of the
person involved, ... [to] represent any person who is not
financially able to employ counsel in a proceeding of any
nature relating to the nature or conditions of detention, of
115. Anne C. Mulkern & Stuart Pfeifer, System is trying to many victims, ORANGE
CoUNTY REG., Oct. 8, 1995, (News) at 32.
116. Turner et al., supra note 8, at 34.
117. Id.
118. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706(g) (West 1988); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 987, 987.2(d)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987(a)-(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
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other restrictions prior to adjudication, of treatment, or of
punishment resulting from criminal or juvenile proceed-
ings.'20
The final determination of the defendant's financial ability to
retain private counsel is made by the court .1' However, "[t]he
public defender shall.., render legal services... for any person the
public defender determines is not financially able to employ counsel
until such time as a contrary determination is made by the court.""
This requirement of indigence does not equate to absolute
destitution. If, by their nature, the assets of an accused cannot be
timely reduced to cash, the present financial inability to obtain
counsel which defines indigence for Sixth Amendment purposes is
met." If the status is temporary or the defendant later gains an
ability to pay, the defendant may have to reimburse the state. 24
120. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706(g).
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987(c) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that "[i]n order to assist
the court in determining whether a defendant is able to employ counsel in any case, the
court may require a defendant to file a financial statement or other financial information
under penalty of perjury").
122. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27707 (West 1988).
123. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1996). Further, California
Penal Code 987.8(g)(2) states:
"Ability to pay" means the overall capability of the defendant to reimburse the
costs, or a portion of the costs, of the legal assistance provided to him or her,
and shall include, but not be limited to, all of the following:
(A) The defendant's present financial position.
(B) The defendant's reasonably discernible future financial position ....
(C) The likelihood that the defendant shall be able to obtain employment
within a six-month period from the date of the hearing.
(D) Any other factor or factors which may bear upon the defendant's
financial capability to reimburse the county for the costs of the legal assistance
provided to the defendant.
CAL. PENAL CODE §987.8(g)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(b) (West Supp. 1996). Section 987.8(b) provides as
follows:
In any case in which a defendant is provided legal assistance, either through the
public defender or private counsel appointed by the court, upon conclusion of
the criminal proceedings in the trial court, or upon the withdrawal of the public
defender... the court may, after notice and a hearing, make a determination
of the present ability of the defendant to pay all or a portion of the cost thereof.
Id.
In People v. Amor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 523 P.2d 1173, 114 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974), the California
Supreme Court determined this practice to be constitutional.
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B. Before and After the Bankruptcy
Those determined by the court to be indigent are assigned an
attorney through the Orange County Office of the Public Defender.
Prior to the December 1994 bankruptcy,"z Orange County em-
ployed a dual system of legal services to indigents through the use of
the Office of the Public Defender and an Alternate Defense Fund,
which provided private attorney services through a flat-fee contract
for conflict of interest cases.1 26  As provided by California Penal
Code section 987.2, the Alternate Defense Fund was financed by the
County's general fund.127 The Office of the Public Defender
handled the majority of the indigent defense cases at a cost of
approximately $20 million, and the private attorneys handled the
conflict of interest cases at a cost of about $12.2 million.
128
This has drastically changed. Subsequent to the bankruptcy, a
three-member Operations Management Council was formed in
December 1994 to recommend an immediate budget reduction to
mitigate the consequences of the bankruptcy.129 The reduction went
125. See supra part I.
126. Jodi Wilgoren, Private Lawyers Left Dry as County Work Evaporates, L.A. TIMES
(Orange County ed.), Jan. 9, 1995, at B1. Wilgoren estimates that contract attorneys earn
about $350 for a misdemeanor, $450 for a felony that is settled before it goes to a
preliminary hearing, $1000 for a preliminary hearing and the first day of a felony trial, and
$340 per trial day after that. Id. at B4.
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996). Section 987.2(a)(3) states:
(a) In any case in which a person ... desires but is unable to employ counsel,
and in which counsel is assigned in the ... court to represent the person in a
criminal trial, proceeding, or appeal, the following assigned counsel shall receive
a reasonable sum for compensation and for necessary expenses, the amount of
which shall be determined by the court, to be paid out of the general fund of the
county:
(3) In a case in which the court finds that, because of a conflict of interest
or other reasons, the public defender has properly refused.
Id. § 987.2(a)(3).
128. Anna Cekola, Defender's Office Meets Cuts but Seeks Relief, L.A. TIMES (Orange
County ed.), June 24, 1995, at B1, B8. In 1993-1994 the Office of the Public Defender
handled 61,379 indigent cases while private attorneys handled about 6100 cases. Id. In
the 1994-1995 fiscal year, the Orange County Office of the Public Defender actually spent
$20,339,238, and the Alternate Defense Fund spent $9,051,925. COUNTY EXECUTIVE
OFFICE, COUNTY OF ORANGE, FY 1995-96 ANNUAL BUDGET 32 (1995) [hereinafter
ANNUAL BUDGET].
129. Tracy Weber & Anna Cekola, Public Defender Cuts Cost Private Lawyers, L.A.
TIMES (Orange County ed.), Jan. 5, 1995, at A7; Dan Weikel & Rene Lynch, Sheriff and
D.A.'s Role in Cuts Is Questioned, L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.), Dec. 24, 1994, at A20;
Dan Weikel & Julie Marquis, Services Used by Poor are Hit Hardest, L.A. TIMES (Orange
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into effect for the fiscal year ending in June 1995. Sheriff-Coroner
Brad Gates, District Attorney Michael R. Capizzi, and Health Care
Agency Director Thomas E. Uram comprised the members of this
council. 3
The most severe reductions recommended by this council affected
programs which serviced Orange County's poor. Orange County's
funding for poor citizens' health care, social services, and defense
attorneys for impoverished criminal defendants bore the brunt of the
reductions adopted by the Board of Supervisors. 31 Most severely
impacted by the reduction was the Alternate Defense Fund which
suffered a devastating cut of 29%, or $3.7 million." In contrast,
the Orange County Sheriff-Coroner's Department and the Office of
the District Attorney, which both enjoyed budget increases exceeding
24% and 31% respectively in the 1994-1995 fiscal year, suffered only
minimal budget cuts. 133 The Office of the District Attorney suffered
a cut of only 1.1% and the Sheriff-Coroner's Department a reduction
of only 0.7%.134
The Office of the Public Defender was able to escape any
reduction in its actual budget but only at a substantial cost to its
effective operation.35 The Office of the Public Defender took over
virtually every indigent case by splitting into three offices. 36 A new
County ed.), Dec. 23, 1994, at Al, A32.
130. Weikel & Marquis, supra note 129, at A32.
131. Id. at Al.
132. Id. at A32. In the final approved budget for the 1995-1996 fiscal year, the
Alternate Defense Fund was appropriated $3,292,334, a reduction of over $5,000,000.
COUNTY OF ORANGE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BUDGET UNIT FINANCING USES DETAIL,
UNIT TITLE CLASSIFICATION PUBLIC DEFENDER (1994-1995) (on file with Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter UNIT FINANCING USES DETAIL (1994-1995)]; COUNTY
OF ORANGE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BUDGET UNIT FINANCING USES DETAIL, UNIT
TITLE CLASSIFICATION PUBLIC DEFENDER (1995-1996) (on file with Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter UNIT FINANCING USES DETAIL (1995-1996)];
133. Id.
134. Weikel & Lynch, supra note 129, at A20-A22; Weikel & Marquis, supra note 129,
at A32. The District Attorney's Office was appropriated $55,273,873 for the 1995-1996
fiscal year and the Sheriff-Coroner's Office received $184,636,465, whereas the Office of
the Public Defender was given $23,244,476. ANNUAL BUDGET, supra note 128, at 32.
135. The Office of the Public Defender received a budget of $23,244,476 for the 1995-
1996 fiscal year, which is an increase of more than $1.5 million from the 1994-1995 fiscal
year. UNIT FINANCING USES DETAIL (1995-1996), supra note 132. However, the funds
appropriated must now fund both the Office of the Public Defender and the secondary
Alternate Defender's Office. The tertiary Associate Defender's Office is funded by the
Alternate Defense Fund which received a devastating budget cut of over $5,000,000. See
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
136. Weber & Cekola, supra note 129, at A7.
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secondary "Alternate Defender's Office" and a tertiary "Associate
Defender's Office" were created to handle any conflict of interest
cases. 7 If the Office of the Public Defender cannot handle an
indigent defendant because of a conflict of interest, the case is
forwarded to the Alternate Defender's Office. If a conflict arises in
the secondary office, the case is then forwarded to the Associate
Defender's Office. It was estimated that the cases which could not be
handled by any of the three offices would be minimal. This move,
approved by the Board of Supervisors for the 1995-1996 fiscal year
beginning in July 1995, was expected to result in a $7.4 million savings
per year.'38
Unfortunately, all is not bliss. This move has overburdened an
already heavily taxed program. It resulted in an estimated 6000
additional cases for the Office of the Public Defender, without any
increase in its budget. It was estimated that in the fiscal year 1995-
1996, the Office of the Public Defender will handle about 75,000 cases
with an estimated case load of 610 cases per each full-time lawyer.1
3 9
The California Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question
of whether this type of inadequate funding for a public defender's
program renders it unconstitutional under the Strickland standard.
With these recent changes in the Orange County Office of the Public
Defender, this Comment asserts that it cannot meet its "overarching
duty to advocate the defendant's cause" and that the lack of resources
necessarily forces the defenders' representation below the objective
standard of reasonableness, resulting in prejudice to indigent
defendants as required by Strickland.4 ° For this reason, the Orange
County's public defender's program must be declared unconstitution-
al.
137. Id.
138. Cekola, supra note 128, at B8; Weber & Cekola, supra note 129, at A7. This move
has, in fact, resulted in a $5 million savings since the implementation of the new structure.
Cekola, supra note 128, at B1.
139. Cekola, supra note 128, at B8.
140. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
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V. A REVIEW OF ORANGE COUNTY'S OFFICE OF
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
A. The Application of Justice Mosk's Standard
Justice Mosk's analysis in In re Avena identifies the constitutional
standard that should be used in determining the constitutionality of
the new public defender program in Orange County. The budget cuts
in the Office of the Public Defender and the reorganization of the
structure are circumstances which are "so likely to prejudice [indigent
defendants] that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case
is unjustified.''. Justice Mosk's dissenting analysis provides a much
more logical and rational solution to protecting the constitutional right
to counsel for the state's citizens, and is much more in accord with the
intent and rationale for the development of the right to court-
appointed counsel. 42
The Supreme Court recognized that right to counsel is integral to
a fair trial, because of the role that counsel plays in an adversarial
system.'43 For this reason, the Court acknowledged the need to
provide counsel to indigent defendants, and extended the scope of
Sixth Amendment protection to include the right to court-appointed
counsel.1" Justice Mosk's standard recognizes the fact that this
right can be compromised by more than an actual denial of counsel.
It can result from lack of participation and assistance of counsel which
amounts to a constructive denial of counsel.145
The budget cuts and the reorganization by the Orange County
Board of Supervisors is a type of state interference which amounts to
a constructive denial of the assistance of counsel and must be
presumed to result in prejudice to the indigent defendants. Approxi-
mately two-thirds of those charged with crimes in Orange County
cannot pay for their own lawyers.1" The defense of these indigent
defendants falls upon the Orange County's Office of the Public
Defender. In light of the Orange County bankruptcy,147 the Orange
141. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1983).
142. See supra parts II.A-B.
143. See supra parts II.A-B.
144. See supra parts II.A.2-3.
145. See supra part II.C.
146. Public Defenders' Rising Burden, L.A. TIMEs (Orange County ed.), July 26, 1995,
at B8.
147. See supra part IV.B.
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County Board of Supervisors created the Alternate Defender's Office
and the Associate Defender's Office in hopes of saving the county
money. These additional agencies have saved approximately $5
million between December 1994 and June 1995 by eliminating the
need to hire private attorneys to handle conflict of interest cases.'48
But even with three units, the caseload at the Office of the Public
Defender has become nearly unbearable.'49 Carl Holmes, Orange
County's Chief Deputy Public Defender, stated that backlogs are
growing in cases involving the death penalty and repeat felons facing
twenty-five years to life in prison under the state's three-strikes
law. 5' The Office of the Public Defender is losing attorneys-about
six so far-and efforts to attract experienced replacements to handle
complicated cases is almost impossible due to the perceived insecure
future with Orange County as the employer."' The Orange County
Office of the Public Defender is handling its heaviest caseload ever
with virtually no increase in full-time personnel. 5 2 Currently, the
lawyers in all three offices are working sixty-hour weeks without
overtime-many working on weekends.'53  Holmes believes that
without additional lawyers, the agencies will not be able to maintain
that pace. 54
The Associate Defender's Office, with a staff of five lawyers,
represents indigent defendants when the County's two other criminal-
defense offices declare conflicts of interest.'55 Holmes stated that
his office may have to close the Associate Defender's Office 156 and
return to the appointment of private counsel for conflict cases because
the secondary Alternate Defender's Office and the tertiary Associate
Defender's Office do not have enough seasoned attorneys to handle
their cumbersome caseloads.5 5 Holmes believes that a viable
148. Public Defenders' Rising Burden, supra note 146, at B8; Cekola, supra note 128,
at B1.
149. Public Defenders' Rising Burden, supra note 146, at B8.
150. Cekola, supra note 128, at B8.
151. Id.
152. Id. Total cases for 1995-1996: 75,000; cases per full-time lawyer for 1995-1996:
610. Id.
153. Stuart Pfeifer, Defender's office: Spinoffs a bargain, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June
24, 1995, (Metro) at 8.
154. Id.
155. Stuart Pfeifer, Silver lining for private lawyers?, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 16,
1995, (Metro) at 4.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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solution to the backlog of the Office of the Public Defender is to
remove 1000 or so cases from its tertiary office to private attor-
neys.
58
In addition, Orange County faces problems with its investigators
assigned to the Office of the Public Defender. Orange County failed
to pay forty-four public defense investigators overtime for the period
between September 1992 to September 1994.1 These investigators
put in an average of forty-seven hours of work per week during the
two years without receiving overtime pay or compensatory vacation
time.1'6
Currently, the Orange County Office of the Public Defender is
hopelessly backlogged with the addition of the cases previously
handled by private attorneys. It operates with funding and personnel
that is inadequate to meet the needs of its clients. The circumstances
under which the Office of the Public Defender operates fall below the
objective reasonable standard for effectiveness, as measured by
assistance rendered by private as well as public defense attorneys.
The lack of funds and resources, including investigative support,
removes the fundamental guarantee of "confrontation between
adversaries" necessary to ensure a fair trial. This inadequacy is a
failure of adversarial testing of the same magnitude as denial of the
right to cross-examine a witness, such that a showing of actual
prejudice to an individual indigent defendant is unjustified. Justice
Mosk's standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in In re Avena
is intuitively and analytically correct when applied to the Orange
County Office of the Public Defender as a whole. The failure of
adversarial testing from the entire institution of the Office of the
Public Defender results from "state"-Orange County Board of
Supervisors-interference. It potentially affects all indigent defen-
dants represented by the Office of the Public Defender, and thus, an
individualized showing of prejudice flowing from the defender's action
in each case is an unjustifiably duplicative and excessive cost to be
borne by a single indigent defendant. As a matter of judicial
economy, Justice Mosk's standard is more logical and reasonable than
that set forth by the majority.
158. Rene Lynch, Judges, Lawyers Argue Over Defense of Poor, L.A. TIMEs (Orange
County ed.), July 22, 1995, at A17.
159. Don Lee, Labor Dept. to Sue O.C. on Behalf of 44 Workers, L.A. TIMES (Orange
County ed.), Nov. 21, 1995, at D1.
160. Id. at D9.
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This Comment urges that a presumption of ineffective assistance
of counsel be attached to the legal assistance rendered by the Office
of the Public Defender without inquiry into'the actual conduct of the
trial. Under the current budget and structure, "'the likelihood that
any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective
assistance is so small' that the cost of litigating the issue is unjusti-
fied."' 1  This is exactly the type of "constructive" denial of assis-
tance of counsel envisioned by the United States Supreme Court in
Cronic and articulated by Justice Mosk in In re Avena.
Other jurisdictions have applied a similar analysis to that of
Justice Mosk in reviewing their respective public defender programs
and found them to be sadly inadequate. Though they do not have
any precedential value in California, it is imperative that California
follow these jurisdictions' leads to scrutinize the Orange County
Office of the Public Defender as a whole. California should abandon
the costly and protracted process of individualized review of indigent
defendants' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. Other States
1. Louisiana
One such analysis was applied in the Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court Section E, in State v. Peart62 In Louisiana, the
legislature enacted statutes to establish an indigent defender system,
under which Indigent Defender Boards were created to determine the
method of indigent defense operations in each judicial district. 6
The Boards choose among public defender, contract attorney, and
assigned counsel models or may use a combination of these mod-
els.1" The New Orleans Board created the Orleans Indigent
Defender Program (OIDP) which operates under a public defender
model.16 The trial court appointed Rick Teissier to defend Peart
against charges of armed robbery, aggravated rape, aggravated
burglary, and attempted armed robbery."6 Teissier, in turn, filed a
161. In re Avena, 12 Cal. 4th 694,726-27,909 P.2d 1017,1036,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 413,432
(1996) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60).
162. 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
163. Id. at 783.
164. Id. at 784 n.1.
165. Id at 784.
166. Id.
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Motion for Relief to Provide Constitutionally Mandated Protection
and Resources, claiming that Peart was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel.' 67 -
At the time Teissier was appointed to Peart's case, Teissier was
one of only two OIDP attorneys assigned to the district and was
handling seventy active felony cases."6 Teissier's clients were
routinely incarcerated thirty to seventy days before he met with them,
and in the period between January 1 and August 1, 1991, Teissier
represented 418 defendants-of which he entered 130 guilty pleas at
arraignment.169 The OIDP had only enough funds to hire three
investigators and were responsible for rendering assistance in more
than 7000 cases per year in the ten sections of Criminal District
Court.'7 In routine cases Teissier received no investigative support
and no funds for expert witnesses.1
71
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that since there is no precise
definition of reasonably effective assistance of counsel, any inquiry
into the effectiveness of counsel must necessarily be individualized
and fact driven.'7 However, the court determined that it must
make some global findings about the state of indigent defense to aid
the trial judge reviewing a defendant's pretrial claim that he is
receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. 73 The court interpreted
reasonably effective assistance of counsel to mean that the lawyer not
only possess skill and knowledge, but also that the lawyer has the
time and the resources to apply the skill and knowledge to the task
of defending each individual client. 74 The court contrasted the
conditions set forth above against those of the American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice and found that the
conditions routinely violated the standards on workload by interfering
with the rendering of quality representation, initial provision of






172. Id. at 788.
173. l The court held that when the trial court has sufficient information before trial,
the judge can inquire into any ineffective assistance claims where possible to further the
interest of judicial economy, and defendant need not wait until appeal to bring up the
claim. Id. at 787. Further, it is immaterial that the ineffective assistance rendered may or
may not affect the outcome of the trial to the defendant's detriment. Id.
174. IU. at 789.
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investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues
leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case.' 75 As a result, the
court found the indigent defendants in Section E to be provided with
counsel who could perform only pro forma, and who were so
overburdened as to be effectively unqualified.176
The court, to avoid more intrusive and specific measures in
remedying this defect, held that a rebuttable presumption arose that
indigents in Section E were not receiving assistance of counsel
sufficiently effective to meet constitutionally required standards.
177
This presumption may be rebuttable as evidenced by the fact that the
trial court in Peart found Peart himself had received effective
assistance.178 It does demonstrate, however, that the public defend-
er must select certain clients to whom they give more attention than
others.1
7 1
This is essentially the situation prevailing at this time in the
Orange County Office of the Public Defender. The lack of resources,
investigative support, and expert witnesses; the excessive caseload per
attorney; and the need to "pick and choose" the clients to whom a
public defender will give more attention than others mirror those
inadequacies found presumptively unconstitutional in Peart. The
public defenders in Orange County can serve as no more than pro
forma counsel and are so overburdened as to be effectively unquali-
fied. The public defenders, although they may possess the skill and
knowledge, lack the time and resources to apply their skills to
adequately defend their clients. Therefore, a rebuttable presumption
should arise that indigent defendants represented by the Orange
County Office of the Public Defender are not receiving assistance of
counsel sufficiently effective to meet constitutionally required
standards.
2. Arkansas and Kansas
Likewise, in Arnold v. Kemp 8' and State v. Smith,18' two state
supreme courts addressed the issue of inadequate funding for the
175. Id. (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-
1.3(e), 4-4.1, 5-6.1 (1991)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 791.
178. Id. at 785 n.4.
179. Id.
180. 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991).
181. 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987).
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defense of indigents. Though the cases specifically dealt with whether
the fee limitations for court-appointed indigent defense attorneys
violated their right to due process and just compensation,"s they are
significant because of their holdings regarding the standard for
sufficient funding for indigent defense. In essence, both cases
determined that attorneys make their living through their services and
"[w]hen attorneys' services are conscripted for the public good, such
a taking is akin to the taking of food or clothing from a merchant or
the taking of services from any other professional for the public
good."' 3 The cases also noted that when attorneys are required to
donate out-of-pocket funds to subsidize a defense for an indigent
defendant, the attorneys are deprived of property in the form of
money.'84 Thus the attorneys' services are property subject to Fifth
Amendment protection.' 85
Though these cases deal with court-appointed attorneys through
the private sector, the courts set forth an inescapable standard.
Indigent defense attorneys must be provided with adequate funding
for expenses that are plainly necessary for defendants to have their




Florida similarly reviewed the impact of inadequate funding on
indigent appellants."m The state of Florida provides defendants with
the statutory right to appeal their judgments and sentences."
Because Douglas v. California9 held that indigent appellants are
entitled to the same ability to obtain meaningful appellate review as
wealthy appellants, the Florida Supreme Court in In re Order
addressed whether this constitutional mandate is met by the Florida
indigent defender scheme.90
182. Arnold, 813 S.W.2d at 771; Smith, 747 P.2d at 821.
183. Arnold, 813 S.W.2d at 774 (quoting Smith, 747 P.2d at 842).
184. Id. (quoting Smith, 747 P.2d at 842).
185. Id. (quoting Smith, 747 P.2d at 842).
186. Id. at 777; Smith, 747 P.2d at 836.
187. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit
Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
188. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.06 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
189. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
190. Order, 561 So. 2d at 1131.
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In the Second District of Florida, due to the tremendous backlog
of indigent appeals, the briefs of nonindigents were being filed at least
a year sooner than those of indigents represented by the public
defender.19 The court held that the lengthy delay in filing initial
briefs in appeals by indigents is a clear violation of the indigent state
defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on
appeal."9 The court determined the source of this problem as the
"woefully inadequate funding of the public defenders' offices."''
Though this case dealt with appellate review, the court acknowledged
that the problem of underfunding affects both trial and appellate
caseloads. 94
With a backlog of cases, the public defender must choose which
of the appellants' appeals to pursue according to the severity of their
sentences. Such excessive caseloads forcing the public defender to
choose between the rights of the various indigent criminal defendants
invariably creates a conflict of interest. 95 The court reiterated the
lower court's holding that "'[t]he rights of defendants in criminal
proceedings brought by the state cannot be subjected to the fate of
choice no matter how rational that choice may be because of the
circumstances of the situation.""9'
The court held that where the "backlog of cases in the public
defender's office is so excessive that there is no possible way [the
attorney] can timely handle those cases," the attorney should move
the court to withdraw, and the court should appoint other private
counsel to handle such "conflict of interest" cases."9  The court
specifically held that this procedure is to be applied prospectively to
both trial and appeal cases. 98 However, for those cases which are
currently stuck in the enormous backlog of appellate cases awaiting
briefs, the court recommended the "massive employment of the
private sector bar on a 'one-shot' basis"-the funding of such
emergency measure to be determined by the legislature.1"
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1131-32 (citation omitted).
193. Id. at 1132.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1135.
196. Id. (quoting In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial
Circuit Pub. Defender, Nos. 74574, 74580, 74629, 74630 & 74631, slip op. at 3 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. May 12, 1989)).
197. Id. at 1138.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1138-39.
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Under the standards in Arnold, Smith, and In re Order, the
Orange County Office of the Public Defender yet again falls short of
the constitutional mandate for effective assistance of counsel. All
three cases emphasized the need for adequate funding of expenses as
are plainly necessary for the defendants to have their day in court and
for counsels to adequately and fairly present the defendants' cases.
This includes adequate funding for investigation and expert witnesses.
Equally important is adequate funding of the public defender's office
to eliminate or reduce the backlog of cases so that the defender is not
forced to choose between the rights of the various indigent defen-
dants. The Orange County Office of the Public Defender is unable
to meet these requirements because of the inadequate funding of its
offices. Inadequate resources and staff make it impossible for public
defenders in Orange County to meet the overarching duties to
advocate the defendant's cause and to consult with the defendant on
important decisions and developments in the course of the prosecu-
tion, deemed so important by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the
Orange County Office of the Public Defender should be determined
unconstitutional.
VI. THE IMPACT OF UNDERFUNDING ON PUBLIC DEFENDER
PROGRAMS-A PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENT
The underfunding problem of public defender programs is sadly
not confined to the Orange County district. Reductions in funding for
indigent services by bankrupt or financially strapped municipalities are
exceedingly prevalent in today's depressed economy. With the focus
on fighting crime, more and more funding is diverted to hiring more
police officers and to district attorney's offices, with the resulting
adverse effect on the public defender's programs.2  Politicians
receive "Brownie points" for making and enforcing laws and for
200. The nationwide movement to enact three-strikes legislation reflects this sentiment.
The legislators and the public support "law and order" policies because they appear to
provide a simple solution to the pressing problem of increasing crime. Turner et al., supra
note 8, at 33. However, statistics show that the number of violent crimes from 1976 to
1991 has actually decreased from 3260 to 3130 per 100,000 victimizations, as have the
number of property crimes, such as burglary-from 8890 to 5310. Id. at 16, The total
number of crimes increased only nominally from 5287 to 5898 per 100,000 during the same
period. Id. In addition, research suggests that habitual-offender laws have done little to
achieve a meaningful reduction in crime. Id. at 33.
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adding more police, but none for funding the defense.2 1 This
imbalance simultaneously slows down the system and fuels appeals
based upon the argument of ineffective assistance of counsel.2"
Several states have undergone reductions in their public
defender's budgets in the past year. In Cayuga County, New York,
the number of criminal and state prisoner parole hearing cases
assigned to lawyers at taxpayer expense increased by 16% in 1995.203
In addition, the costs of assigned counsel programs rose by 18%."
The public defender's office provided services to indigent defendants
at a cost of $269,438 in 1995.205 Yet, even though the number of
cases handled by the public defender's office increased from 1005 in
1994 to 1166 in 1995, the 1996 budget allocates only $252,271 for
indigent defense? 6 The courts' answer to meeting the new budget
crunch is to more closely scrutinize defendants claiming indigent
status.207
In Arizona, counties hope to receive relief from a bill proposed
by Senate Judiciary Chair Patti Noland which would increase funds to
public defender's offices. 8 The Pima County Deputy Administra-
tor noted that the cost of indigent defense has risen 250% in the past
decade.0 9 On average, all fifteen counties in Arizona have in-
creased funding for indigent defense by 292% over the last ten years
but are still unable to meet the burden."' 0 The financial burden
stems partly from the fact that public defenders must pay for their
own experts whereas the prosecutors are provided free medical
experts by the county.211 The trainer for the Maricopa County
Public Defender's Office noted that because the defenders are
overworked and underpaid, errors occur in cases.212  The public
201. Rhonda Bodfield, Help sought for public defenders, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 4,1996,
at 1C.
202. Id.
203. David L. Shaw, Request for Lawyers Could Get More Scrutiny: The Director of
the County Assigned Counsel Program Asks for the Cooperation of Judges, SYRACUSE





208. Bodfield, supra note 201, at 1C, 3C.
209. Id. at 1C.
210. Id.
211. Id. The public defender's office spends up to $10,000 to hire an expert to conduct
DNA tests. Id.
212. Id.
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defenders have such burdensome caseloads that it sometimes takes
two or three weeks to see the person they are assigned to defend, and
the defender will go to court immediately after spending two months
on another trial without having time to research the latest case.213
In addition, the Marion County Public Defender Agency, in
Indianapolis, barely escaped shutting its doors recently when the City-
County Council voted to give the agency an extra $482,000 to see its
budget through 1995.214 The agency saw a 17% increase in the
number of indigents and a 41% increase in trials in 1995? " The
additional funds were requested to hire investigators and expert
witnesses, and to pay for records and other documents,216 as well as
to prevent cuts in staff 217 While the agency was awaiting approval
of its request for additional funds, the agency instituted a thirty-day
moratorium on ordering trial transcripts.2"' The agency was further
prohibited from accepting collect calls from prisoners in jail.219
The public defender agency in Marion County had a budget of
$4.4 million but requested and received an additional $116,000 earlier
in the year."2 The prosecutor's office has a budget of $5.2 mil-
lion. 1  Marion County Prosecutor Scott Newman opposed the
budget increase claiming that the county is "spending more money on
crooks than on crime victims."'
This is a common response to any increase in budgets for
indigent defense. Approval for the additional $482,000 in Marion
County came only after Republicans expressed strong reservations
about the increased costs of defending people described as "'so-called
indigents."" There is a prevailing view that deems it "'[un]fair for
213. Id.
214. Gerry Lanosga, Council OKs extra $482,000 for Public Defender Agency,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 31, 1995, at El.
215. Id. at E2.
216. Ma; Murder case on hold, defense lacks funds, COURIER-J. (Indiana), Oct. 22, 1995,
at B5.
217. Marion County's public defender may have to cut staff, COURIER-J. (Indiana), Sept.
19, 1995, at B2.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Kathleen M. Johnston, Public defender agency running out of funds, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al, A2.
221. Janet E. Williams, Public defender has too much money and shouldn't get more,
Newman says, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 3, 1995, at Al, A2.
222. Id at Al.
223. Lanosga, supra note 214, at El (quoting William Dowden, Chairman of the City-
County Council's public.safety and criminal justice committee).
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[the county] to ask law-abiding citizens to carry the financial burdens
of the lawless ... ."" This view originates from the erroneous
general public belief that those who are arrested and charged with a
crime must be guilty-if not of the crime for which they are charged,
then of some other crime. But fundamental to the viability of the
criminal-justice system is the ideal that all persons are innocent until
proven guilty.' Each person must be provided with assistance
reasonably effective enough to allow the adversarial system to seek
and find the truth. The goal of the Constitution is not to convict as
many defendants as possible, but rather to convict, after a fair and
equitable trial, those persons found guilty of a crime. The constitu-
tional guarantees, enumerated and implied, do not differentiate
between the rich and the poor. The Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution specifically provides that "[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States" shall be accorded its protections.2 6
It does not accord less protection for the poor. Any person who faces
the risk of losing life, liberty, or property must be accorded the full
protections of the Constitution." This nation is founded upon the
often tested and-one hopes by now-the proven principle that "all
[persons] are created equal,"' and as such are entitled to the same
protections under its laws.
Thus, the failure to provide adequate funding for the defense of
the nation's poor can, in the end, only harm the society as a whole.
Any diminution in the rights of the indigent iesults in a proportional
diminution and erosion of the rights of all persons. No one benefits
if one side has more resources than the other. "'The criminal justice
system doesn't move any faster than the slowest-moving party.
[Prosecutors and public defenders] need to be able to run at the same
speed."'' 9 What does it mean to convict all those accused if the
cost of such convictions is the loss of individual rights and erroneous
punishment of innocents? The indigent defendants must be entitled
to the same minimal standards of effective assistance of counsel as
224. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Republican Ron Franklin).
225. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (CAIIC) No. 2.90 (5th ed.
Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
226. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
227. Id
228. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
229. Williams, supra note 221, at A2 (quoting Jon M. Bailey, Chairman of the Marion
County Public Defender Board).
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fee-paying defendants. 20  The American Bar Association agrees.
John J. Curtin, Jr., of the American Bar Association, recently stated
his concerns before Congress that indigent defendants should receive
at least the same quality of representation afforded the fee-paying
client. 31
Reduction of crime is a goal which most Americans can agree
must be pursued diligently and zealously. However, this goal can not
and must not be obtained by depriving the poor of their life or liberty
without due process of law. A victory in the fight against crime can
only ring hollow if society must sacrifice its poor to achieve it.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the above analysis, it is clear that the rights of indigent
defendants in Orange County, as those of indigents around the
country, are in serious jeopardy. The right to the effective assistance
of counsel is one of the most precious rights that citizens of the
United States possess. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to all
persons born or naturalized in the United States the right to equal
protection of its laws. 32 This noble and honorable ideal becomes
a mere sham in a system which determines people's innocence on the
basis of their wealth.
As an emergency measure, the Board of Supervisors for the
County of Orange must immediately appropriate funding for the
massive employment of the private sector bar on a 'one-shot" basis
to clear the backlog of indigent cases which the combined Orange
County Office of the Public, Defenders are unable to handle. 3 Carl
Holmes, Orange County's Chief Deputy Public Defender, stated that
the removal of approximately 1000 cases from the combined public
defender offices to private attorneys can eliminate the current
backlog.'
230. This Comment does not suggest that indigent defendants are entitled to the same
type of defense as O.J. Simpson, or others who are able to afford the best attorneys that
money can buy. It merely suggests that there is a minimum standard of effective assistance
of counsel to which all defendants are entitled, whether they are indigent or fee-paying.
231. The Federal Courts Improvement Act: Hearings on S. 1101 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Oversight and Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995) (statement of John J. Curtin, Jr., A.B.A.), available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS database (quoting John J. Curtin, Jr.).
232. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
233. See In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit
Pub. Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1138 (Fla. 1990).
234. Lynch, supra note 158, at A17; see supra part V.A.2.
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One such measure has already been proposed. State Senator
Quentin L. Kopp (I-San Francisco) has introduced a bill in the state
senate to allow Orange County judges to bypass the Office of the
Public Defender and appoint private attorneys for a price to be
determined by the judges. 5 The bill proposed an amendment to
California Penal Code section 987.2 which would allow the judges to,
"[i]n the interest of justice, ... depart from that portion of the
procedure requiring appointment of county-contracted attorney after
making a finding of good cause and stating the reasons therefor on
the record.' 6 It is the hope that this bill will eliminate the current
problems with backlog of cases in the Office of the Public Defender
by giving the judges the authority to bypass it when warranted.
Though this bill may prospectively assist the Office of the Public
Defender with its excessive caseload, it faces opposition because of
the concerns that the bill could lead judges to favor certain attor-
neys. 7 Though he concurs with the method, Carl Holmes opposes
Kopp's bill because of its potential for favoritism? 8 It is recom-
mended that such legislative action can alleviate the caseload that
plagues the new Orange County public defender program. However,
any law which allows for appointment of private counsel when needed
must set forth some guidelines to avoid any arbitrary and capricious
selection of attorneys.
This Comment also proposes that Orange County undertake an
extensive investigation into the constitutionality of the public
defender's program and remedy whatever defects exist through
additional funding. Until this action is taken by Orange County, this
Comment urges the California Supreme Court to find a rebuttable
presumption of unconstitutionality in the Orange County public
defender's program which must be overcome by the prosecution,
These recommendations are further urged to be applied to public
defender's programs throughout the nation to ensure the protection
of the rights of all persons, rich or poor.
Sonia Y Lee
235. Lynch, supra note 158, at A17; Public Defenders' Rising Burden, supra note 146,
at B8.
236.- CALIFORNIA S.B. 16, 1995-1996 2d Extraordinary Sess. 3 (1995).
237. Lynch, supra note 158, at A17; Public Defenders' Rising Burden, supra note 146,
at B8.
238. Lynch, supra note 158, at A17.
